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Incentivizing Armed Non-State Actors to Comply 
with the Law: Protecting Children in Times of 
Armed Conflict 
ABSTRACT 
 
Although the use of child soldiers is an international problem, it is 
difficult to reconcile international law with the compliance of armed 
non-state actors, or ANSAs. International law usually binds states and 
seldom reaches ANSAs. Geneva Call, a non-profit group based out of 
Switzerland, has written Deeds of Commitment as possible compliance 
mechanisms for some international issues, including the use of children 
in armed conflict. Under current international law, Deeds of 
Commitment concerning child soldiers, such as the one created by Geneva 
Call, carry no binding nature and represent no enforceable norm 
against organized armed groups. However, they still hold significant 
potential as a method by which ANSAs may commit to abide by 
international norms in a way that is analogous to a unilateral 
statement. The international community should find ways to encourage 
compliance with these Deeds by threatening measures such as sanctions, 
delegitimization, and political isolation, or by offering economic 
incentives, training, law-making abilities, and a political position to 
help rebuild a state. As Deeds of Commitment have proven successful so 
far, it appears that attracting more ANSA signatories could broaden 
their positive international effect. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[A] child is someone who is completely dependent on his parents 
to be fed, to be cared for, to be dressed and housed.”1 Children play 
outside, fight with their siblings, and tease their parents. “Children 
are . . . very curious creatures.”2 They follow what the adults do. But 
they are young, they are innocent, and they are naïve. “They have no 
fear and do not realize they can be affected.”3 They mimic the ways 
the adults socialize. The adults leave to get together with people from 
different communities, and sometimes the children are invited to 
come along. The children think that perhaps it is a sort of game played 
with people from other places. But this game is different. Sometimes, 
the ones who come back have changed. And sometimes, not everyone 
comes back. “The…[children] can be very happy during [these 
games], but then afterwards will be very sad when they realize that 
they have lost friends or when they have to confront wounded 
comrades. The children become very perturbed and no longer react 
 
 1. GENEVA CALL, IN THEIR WORDS: PERSPECTIVES OF ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS ON 
THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM THE EFFECTS OF ARMED CONFLICT 13 (2010) 
[hereinafter GENEVA CALL]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
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like children. Their faces are often sad. They spend their time reliving 
the different events in their heads.”4 The new game is war. 
The above quotations come from an official statement from the 
Armée populaire pour la restauration de la République et la 
démocratie (People’s Army for the Restoration of Democracy), or 
APRD—a rebel group in the Central African Republic. In the same 
statement, the APRD expressed that it was “disagreeably surprised” to 
learn that it was on the UN’s list of movements that use children in 
warfare.5 It believes that children are never recruited, and that if 
children do get involved, it is often without the knowledge of the 
APRD chiefs.6 “It is because the war was brought to us that the 
children suffered the consequences,” the statement reported.7 In the 
APRD’s eyes, it is not its fault that children were fighting in its wars. 
In fact, children fight in many nations. International criminal 
offenses committed by children encompass “crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and genocide,” and they do not happen “by a child acting 
in isolation but are offenses that occur in the course of armed 
conflicts.”8 When economies suffer, “street children appear—working 
as hawkers, beggars, and child prostitutes,” because they effectively 
have to make the decision to provide for themselves.9 In areas of 
armed conflict, many children choose to become soldiers in order to 
survive. In some cases, armed groups may entice children to become 
soldiers, and seeing no other option, the children may easily be 
taken in.10 
Instances of child recruitment are not identical.11 Although state 
forces have historically been known to employ children in their armies,12 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 14. 
 6. Id. at 13–14. 
 7. Id. at 14. 
 8. Paola Konge, International Crimes & Child Soldiers, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 41, 43 (2010). 
 9. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, Sacrificial Lambs of Globalization: Child Labor in the 
Twenty-First Century, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 421, 432 (2009). 
 10. See Jason Hart, The Politics of “Child Soldiers,” 13 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 217, 218 
(2007) (expressing concern “at the ways that the issue of child recruitment is currently being 
appropriated in pursuit of aims that may have little or nothing to do with the well-being of 
the young”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. UNICEF, Children as Soldiers, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 1996, 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/2csoldrs.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2016). 
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this practice is virtually nonexistent among state actors. Instead, “the 
primary crux of the child soldier problem has shifted to the recruitment 
of children by nongovernmental armed groups, such as insurgents; 
rebels; revolutionary movements; guerrilla fighters; global terrorist 
networks; regional tribal, ethnic, and religious militants; and local 
defense organizations.”13 In other words, armed non-state actors 
(ANSAs) are those primarily to blame for using child soldiers. 
Although the use of child soldiers is an international problem, the 
concept of requiring ANSAs to comply with international law is 
difficult. ANSAs who use child soldiers are not compliant with 
international law. However, international law usually binds only states 
and seldom reaches ANSAs, except to the extent that it is translated 
into domestic law.14 Therefore, international laws that would prevent 
states from using child soldiers and provide sanctions for non-
compliance are less effective with respect to ANSAs. Nevertheless, 
there are some mechanisms in place to combat this practice.  
Geneva Call, a non-profit group based out of Switzerland, has 
written Deeds of Commitment as possible compliance mechanisms for 
some of these international issues, including the use of children in 
armed conflict.15 Deeds of Commitment are unilateral agreements that 
ANSAs can sign to pledge their compliance with international norms. 
Under current international law, Deeds of Commitment concerning 
child soldiers, such as the one created by Geneva Call,16 are non-
binding and represent no enforceable norm against organized armed 
groups, particularly armed non-state actors. Geneva Call itself notes 
that “[t]here is no denying the challenges”17 of the situation.18 
However, Geneva Call’s Deeds of Commitment give ANSAs the 
opportunity to unilaterally agree to humanitarian provisions.19 
Further, the rising number of signatories indicates a willingness on the 
 
 13. David M. Rosen, The Dilemma of Child Soldiers: How should international law treat 
children engaged in armed conflicts?, 10 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 6, 7 (2010). 
 14. See, e.g., International Laws and Child Rights, CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, 
https://www.child-soldiers.org/international-laws-and-child-rights (last visited Sep. 30, 2016). 
 15. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, http://genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-
of-commitment/ (last visited Sep. 30, 2016). 
 16. This Deed of Commitment regarding the use of child soldiers is called the “Deed of 
Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict.” Id. 
 17. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 7. 
 18.   Id. 
 19. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, supra note 15. 
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part of ANSAs to explore possible solutions.20 Deeds of Commitment 
are useful as alternative mechanisms because they are voluntary.21 Even 
though they are non-binding, they have proven to be effective.22 It is 
possible to build upon and expand those successes by furthering the 
reach of these Deeds and by making them more effective and attractive 
to ANSA groups. 
The international community should find ways to encourage 
compliance with Deeds of Commitment to protect children from the 
effects of armed conflict. To accomplish this objective, the 
international community could incentivize the signing of and 
compliance with Deeds of Commitment by threatening measures such 
as sanctions, delegitimization, and political isolation, or by offering 
economic incentives, training, law-making abilities, and a seat at the 
table in efforts to rebuild and govern war-torn states. 
This Article will first explicate the problem concerning child 
soldiers. Part II introduces child soldiers, who are more effective as 
fighters than might be anticipated and often voluntarily involved in 
armed conflict. Next, it will address the current international law on 
child soldiers. Part III will explain that ANSAs are the primary users 
of child soldiers, and that they are not traditionally subject to 
international law. Part IV introduces non-governmental 
organizations, or NGOs, and their place with regard to those 
international laws. This Article will highlight Geneva Call as an NGO, 
and will place specific emphasis on its unique Deeds of Commitment, 
which will be explained in Part V, and how ANSAs can voluntarily 
commit to and sign these Deeds. Part VI will discuss engagement and 
compliance. As Geneva Call’s Deeds have proven successful so far, it 
appears that the positive international effect of the Deed of 
Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of 
Armed Conflict in particular could be broadened by attracting more 
ANSA signatories through enforcement and incentives, or rather, 
sticks and carrots. Part VII concludes.  
 
 20. See GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, http://genevacall.org/who-we-
are/faqs/#faq (last visited Sep. 30, 2016) (indicating that the expansion of Geneva Call’s 
thematic areas to include the protection of children in armed conflict “has been encouraged by 
ANSAs themselves”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., id. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The increase in and magnitude of the use of children in armed 
conflict are regarded as some of the “[m]ost horrifying of . . . human 
rights violations.”23 Children have been utilized by state and non-state 
groups as soldiers, and “[d]espite . . . international laws, it has proven 
to be difficult to suppress the recruitment of children into armed 
groups.”24 Although virtually all states no longer use child soldiers, 
hundreds of thousands of children are still participating in armed 
conflict through ANSAs.25 Because international law is not binding on 
them, one of the biggest hurdles in overcoming this problem is 
effectively engaging and incentivizing ANSAs regarding their 
compliance with international norms. 
A. Child Soldiering is a Problem 
The use of child soldiers has historical roots. In fact, “historical 
studies show that the armies of the West were filled with ‘boy soldiers’ 
from at least the Middle Ages through World War I. Their ‘nobility’ 
and ‘sacrifice’ in battle were often publicly celebrated.”26 Until the 
mid-1900s, “many national armies recruited children.”27 Even though 
the practice among state actors is all but extinct28 (with the exception 
of “Myanmar (Burma), which makes extensive use of child soldiers to 
meet recruitment goals”29), child soldiers continue to be used by other 
groups.30 There is evidence of “extensive participation” of child 
soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and 
Uganda,31 as well as in other “areas of turmoil” including Sudan and 
Afghanistan.32 In a 2008 Global Report, the Coalition to Stop the Use 
 
 23. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 448. 
 24. Rosen, supra note 13. 
 25. Id. 
 26. David M. Rosen, Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the 
Globalization of Childhood, 109 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST ASS’N 296, 297 (2007). 
 27. Rosen, supra note 13. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Noëlle Quénivet, The Liberal Discourse and the “New Wars” of/on Children, 38 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1053 (2013). 
 31. Id. at 1053. 
 32. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 432. Further, “[t]his crisis has in recent times prevailed in parts 
of Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East.” Id. at 448; see, e.g., id. at 449–50 
5.HAFEN.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  5:22 PM 
989 Incentivizing Armed Non-State Actors 
 995 
of Child Soldiers concluded that “the military recruitment of children 
(under-18s) and their use in hostilities . . . still takes place in one form 
or another in at least 86 countries and territories worldwide.”33 
These countries and territories are currently in the midst of armed 
conflict, and are also likely dealing with government instability, 
particularly in Africa.34 As a result of these conflicts, and due to the 
“combination of poverty, isolation, and upheaval,”35 children have 
been used as “soldiers, spies, guards, human shields, human 
minesweepers, servants, decoys and sentries.”36 In those positions, and 
due to their part in the armed conflict, children are “tortured, raped, 
mutilated, humiliated, and degraded on a scale that is almost 
incomprehensible,”37 even culminating in some instances with armies 
forcing them to kill their own family members.38 
The concept of a child soldier is controversial and highly political, 
which makes it difficult to address with regard to international 
humanitarian norms.39 Reports of the exact number of child soldiers 
vary from about 250,00040 to 300,000,41 and fluctuate based on 
conflict across the world.42 One of the problems with trying to 
estimate the number of children used as soldiers is that although most 
statistics claim to be “derived from field-based research,” they are 
 
(stating the idea that although it is not typically the practice any more, some nations still utilize 
children as soldiers, including Chad, Burma, and Sudan). 
 33. Id. at 448 (quoting Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers: Global 
Report 2008, 3 (2008), http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport. org/files/country_
pdfs/FINAL_2008_Global_Report.pdf); see also https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/
children/Child_Soldiers_Global_Report_Summary.pdf; Panjabi, supra note 9, at 448 (stating that 
“children have been kidnapped and forced to become child soldiers, a clear and egregious violation 
of international law, and a practice that involves state and non-state actors, conventional armies, 
and terrorist groups”). 
 34. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 447. 
 35. Id. at 448. 
 36. Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Labor: Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs, The Worst Forms of 
Child Labor, in CHILD LABOR AND SWEATSHOPS 21 (Ann Manheimer ed., 2006)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 449. 
 39. Rosen, supra note 26, at 297 (“[I]nternational law regarding the realm of child 
soldiers is “built on the humanitarian definition of childhood, [and thus] it inevitably clashes with 
many local understandings of the involvement of young people in war.”). 
 40. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7. 
 41. Hart, supra note 10, at 217. 
 42. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7. 
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not.43 Ultimately, the figure is “not only unknown but unknowable.”44 
Regardless of the exact numbers, the scale of the problem is 
catastrophic and deserves the international community’s focused 
attention—it must find ways to intervene and prevent the continuing 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
1. Children are unexpectedly effective soldiers, preserving a lamentable 
incentive to deploy them 
It may initially seem that children would not make the most 
effective soldiers. They are smaller in stature and less mature, which 
would arguably make them less effective fighters than adults. 
However, the opposite actually proves true. Some view child soldiers 
as ideal members of an army.45 They believe that “child soldiers 
become model soldiers. They are preferred because [they are] blessed 
with great endurance, the ability to survive on relatively little food and 
water, [and because] child soldiers accept orders with few 
questions.”46 In addition, they are easier to manipulate and brainwash; 
their small stature and lack of maturity may make them easier to 
intimidate or force to fight.47 
2. Child Soldiering has negative effects on children 
The effects on child soldiers are far deeper and longer-lasting than 
simply the time and physical effort it takes them to serve in armed 
conflicts. Many who are “trapped in this cycle of violence . . . suffer 
from a variety of psychological and physical problems; their health is 
 
 43. Hart, supra note 10, at 217. 
 44. Id. at 217 (quoting RACHEL BRETT & MARGARET MCCALLIN, CHILDREN: THE 
INVISIBLE SOLDIERS 27 (1996)). Part of the problem with determining a number of child 
soldiers is that different actors in the international community have their own definitions of what 
is or is not a child soldier. Many groups would not classify children in their non-state armed 
community as a soldier. In addition, if actors or groups are familiar with the international 
community’s disapproval of child soldiery, they may be reluctant to report or reveal their use of 
child soldiers. 
 45. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 449. 
 46. Id. (quoting Kingsley Banya & Juliet Elu, The Dilemma of Child Soldiering in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in ‘SUFFER THE LITTLE CHILDREN’: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
CHILD POVERTY AND PUBLIC POLICY 177, 184 (Carol Yeakey et al. eds., 2006)). 
 47. See Konge, supra note 9, at 55 (stating that “young people have heightened 
vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced capacity for moral judgment”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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severely compromised.”48 Further, the “emotional scars on such 
young minds continue for years.”49 Girls are often brought into armed 
conflict to serve as sex slaves, and some even become mothers while 
they are involved in the conflict.50 In those situations, the effects of 
being a child involved in armed conflict are indisputably permanent. 
3. “Voluntary” enlistment is not really voluntary 
The situation is not simple, especially because “children have 
engaged with military groups for a host of reasons.”51 Whether or not 
they are fighting in the war, it might be that children simply join an 
ANSA group to have a place to live, or because joining adds some 
structure and consistency to their lives.52 If given the choice, many 
would even choose to stay with ANSAs rather than going back to their 
homes.53 This may be because there are situations where the 
shortcomings of the international community “created scenarios 
where children were willing to return to non-state armed forces, as 
conditions there were more familiar and better responded to 
children’s needs.”54 
Geneva Call, through a voluntary survey sent to ANSAs, found 
that many of their responses “highlight that children often come to 
[A]NSAs looking for protection, care, excitement, or the chance for 
revenge.”55 Some scholars even take the view that the majority of 
children numbered among the ranks of child soldiers are voluntary 
recruits. Jonathan Somer, the former Legal Advisor and Programme 
Coordinator on Children and Armed non-State Actors for Geneva 
 
 48. Id. at 450. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Hart, supra note 10, at 218. 
 52. See GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 6. 
 53. Jonathan Somer, Engaging Armed Non-State Actors to Protect Children from the 
Effects of Armed Conflict: When the Stick Doesn’t Cut the Mustard, 4 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 106, 
109 (2012). 
 54. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 4. 
 55. Id. at 6. 
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Call,56 remarked, “experience seems to indicate that worldwide there 
are many more ‘voluntary’ than forced recruits.”57 
But what constitutes “voluntary?” If a soldier holds a gun to the 
head of a child until he or she “volunteers” to join the group, then is 
participation really voluntary? As one scholar cautioned, “[g]iven a 
child’s surroundings and circumstances during a war, viewing a child’s 
participation as voluntary is suspect.”58 The idea that children’s 
“voluntary” enlistment as soldiers stems from their lack of alternatives 
squares with traditional notions of child innocence.59 Moreover, “it 
can be immensely distressing to contemplate the notion that children 
may serve effectively and willingly as soldiers, taking the lives of 
others.”60 In addition, the conceptual idea that children may 
voluntarily engage in armed conflict “also entails an emotional 
challenge,” due to the “innocence and sacredness of childhood.”61 
In some instances, children may join an ANSA group without 
realizing the meaning of that group’s involvement in armed conflict. 
For example, the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, reported 
the following:  
A few children appear in JEM camps for different reasons—fleeing 
away following attacks on their villages; looking for food and shelter; 
wanting to connect with relatives in the army or simply for curiosity 
and fun. JEM always takes care of these children and sends them 
back to their families or refugee camps.62  
 
 56.  Jonathan Somer, PERSONA GRATA CONSULTING, 
http://pgconsult.net/PROFILE/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 57. Somer, supra note 53, at 117. 
 58. Konge, supra note 8, at 66. 
 59. Child innocence is a widely accepted view, even in the criminal world. For example, 
domestic law typically treats children as incapable of consenting to certain crimes such as 
underage sex. Tamar R. Birckhead, The “Youngest Profession”: Consent, Autonomy, and 
Prostituted Children, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1097 (2011) (stating that “children should not 
be morally culpable for acts to which they cannot legally consent,” and further arguing that 
children who are statutorily raped “should be considered to lack the capacity to consent to sex”) 
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 276 (1980); In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818, 820 
(Tex. 2010) (“The notion that an underage child cannot legally consent to sex is of longstanding 
origin and derives from the common law.”)). 
 60. Hart, supra note 10, at 224. 
 61. Id. 
 62. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 18. 
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In such cases, even though the children would undoubtedly be 
involved in aspects of armed conflict, if only by association, would they 
qualify as voluntary child soldiers? 
The issue of voluntariness is not a legal issue as much as a moral 
one. There are not laws governing whether a child’s involvement in 
armed conflict can or cannot be voluntary, but rather on whether 
children are allowed to participate at all, regardless of how they 
became involved in the conflict. The idea of a child voluntarily 
enlisting strikes moral discord, and the law and international standards 
accordingly preclude the use of child soldiers, whether voluntary or 
not. Regardless of the exact definition of what constitutes a child 
soldier “volunteer,” there is a risk that “permitting voluntary 
association is a slippery slope that may lead to recruitment and use.”63 
Further, if children were allowed to “voluntarily” enlist, the line 
between forced recruitment and voluntary enlistment would become 
very gray—”voluntary” enlistment would most likely not be 
“voluntary.” In addition, children may mistake the motives of ANSA 
groups and volunteer with false expectations only to find themselves 
unwittingly in the middle of armed conflict. 
Regardless of how children become involved with ANSAs, and 
despite the nuances between specific situations, it is worth considering 
the contexts that result in the use of child soldiers,64 and how best to 
deal with the problem. So far, the international community “has 
developed only very short term instruments for dealing with the issue 
of children in war.”65 Even if there is not a flawless solution available, 
legal steps must be taken. And “[i]n determining what the law ought 
to be, we should consider whom the law is most likely to affect.”66 
Based on the allegations that the primary users of child soldiers are 
ANSAs,67 it would seem that involving ANSAs in the solution is crucial 
to solving the problem.68 Further, despite the fact that international 
law is not binding on ANSAs, protecting and respecting the rights of 
 
 63. Somer, supra note 53, at 117. 
 64. Konge, supra note 8, at 72. 
 65. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 4. 
 66. Konge, supra note 8, at 72. 
 67. See Rosen, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 68. Konge, supra note 8, at 72; see also GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 5. 
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children in war are obligations and standards to which ANSAs should 
still be held.69 
B. Current International Law on Child Soldiers 
The history of international attempts to curb the use of child 
soldiers is long and intricate.70 One scholar noted that “[u]ntil 
recently, virtually all rebel groups stood completely outside the 
framework of international humanitarian law.”71 Evidence of pressure 
to change ANSAs’ isolation from the law includes the recent action by 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in 
Armed Conflict who argued that “[ANSAs] are under a legal 
obligation not to recruit or use child soldiers.”72 In fact, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, or ICRC, reported that 
over 140 rules attempted to help govern ANSA conduct as of 2005.73 
However, as mentioned, it is widely accepted that human rights 
treaties encompass “hard legal obligations” for states only, and not for 
ANSAs.74 There are varying views as to if and how these laws could 
apply to ANSAs based on whether they qualify as a “party” to 
conflict,75 but most scholars agree that international law is only 
 
 69. Annyssa Bellal & Stuart Casey-Maslen, Enhancing Compliance with International 
Law by Armed Non-State Actors, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 175, 189 (2011). 
 70. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 453. 
 71. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7. 
 72. Cedric Ryngaert & Anneleen Van de Meulebroucke, Enhancing and Enforcing 
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: An Inquiry into 
Some Mechanisms, 16 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 443, 449 (2011). 
 73. Pascal Bongard & Jonathan Somer, Monitoring Armed Non-State Actor Compliance 
with Humanitarian Norms: A Look at International Mechanisms and the Geneva Call Deed of 
Commitment, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 673, 674 (2011). 
 74. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449. 
 75. Based on specific language in each respective law, some scholars believe that the 
following laws (which will be explicated in the following section) could imply that an ANSA 
group could be a party: Geneva Conventions, Optional Protocol, Rome Statute, Protocol I, and 
UNSCR. Although the language in these laws might suggest such a possibility, it remains that 
ANSA groups are not generally recognized as parties. For example, Additional Protocol I, Article 
43(1) states:  
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups 
and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its 
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not 
recognized by an adverse Party.  
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries Protocol I: Armed Forces, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS (Aug. 31, 2016, 9:39 PM), https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
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binding on states. Even so, the international community has imposed 
laws of varying quality governing the use of child soldiers, some hard 
and some soft.76 The next two sections will provide an overview 
of each.  
1. The international community has taken formal actions to prevent 
child soldiering 
The current formal actions, or  “hard laws,” that apply to the use 
of child soldiers include the following: Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict, the Rome Statute, 
International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 182, Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, of 8 June 
1977 (Protocol I), and UNSCRs. The age used to define a “child” 
differs somewhat from rule to rule. These laws are formal and 
customary, although they are not binding on ANSA groups. 
Customary International Humanitarian Law “has its origins in the 
customary practices of armies as they developed over the ages”77 and 
comes into existence when an act meets two elements: “Not only must 
the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be 
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it.”78 Customary International Humanitarian Law “is of 
 
Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=AF64638EB5530E58C12563CD0051DB9
3https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=
AF64638EB5530E58C12563CD0051DB93; see also Annyssa Bellal et al., International Law and 
Armed Non-state Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 47, 51 n.22 (2011) (“[Article 
43(1)] begs the question, of course, as to whether this provision has become a customary rule, as 
neither Afghanistan nor the US was a party to Additional Protocol I at that time.”). But see 
Quénivet, supra note 30, at 1080 (stating that despite the lack of participation in these rules, 
international humanitarian law is in fact binding upon armed forces and armed groups). 
 76. “Hard law” includes formal customary and conventional international law, and is not 
binding on ANSAs. “Soft law” is a less formal attempt to impose obligations on ANSAs by allowing 
them to demonstrate commitment to international norms since international law cannot legally 
bind them. 
 77.  Introduction, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in (last visited Oct. 13, 2016). 
 78. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den.; Fed. Republic of 
Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. ¶ 77 (Feb. 20); see also Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated 
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crucial importance in today’s armed conflicts because it fills gaps left 
by treaty law and so strengthens the protection offered to victims.”79 
Further, it “continues to be relevant” because “while some States have 
not ratified important treaty law, they remain nonetheless bound by 
rules of customary law,” and also because of “the relative weakness of 
treaty law governing non-international armed conflicts—those that 
involve armed groups and usually take place within the boundaries of 
one country.”80 Rule 135 of the Customary International 
Humanitarian Law states: “Children affected by armed conflict are 
entitled to special respect and protection.”81 Further, Rule 136 states: 
“Children must not be recruited into armed forces or armed 
groups,”82 and Rule 137 follows with: “Children must not be allowed 
to take part in hostilities.”83 As a general rule, customary international 
law is binding on all states. The particular language in this statute 
regarding the special protection of children is fairly unique, but shows 
the international community’s value on allowing children to remain 
and act as children rather than soldiers. 
 
Formation of Customary International Law, 20 ILSA J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 311 (2014); 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Summary), Public International Law, RWANTHIKA 
GUNARATNE & PUB. INT’L L., https://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2014/
02/28/north-sea-continental-shelf-cases-summary/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) (“The North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases confirmed that both State practice (the objective element) and 
opinion juris (the subjective element) are essential pre-requisites for the formation of a 
customary law rule. This is consistent with Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ.”); 
Customary International Law, Introduction, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin (last visited Oct. 
13, 2016). 
 79.  Detail, Customary Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law (last visited Oct. 13, 
2016); see also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-international-humanitarian-law-0  (2010). 
 80.  Customary International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/customary-international-humanitarian-law-0 (2010). 
 81. Rule 135. Children, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule135 (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2016). 
 82. Rule 136. Recruitment of Child Soldiers, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule136 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2016). 
 83. Rule 137. Participation of Child Soldiers in Hostilities, Customary IHL, INT’L COMM. 
OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_
chapter39_rule137 (last visited Sept. 27, 2016). 
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Second, the Convention on the Rights of the Child outlines the 
responsibilities of States Parties in Article 38.84 Article 38(2) declares, 
“States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part 
in hostilities.”85 “All feasible measures” is a strong phrase, illustrating 
the extreme importance of protecting children in the eyes of the law. 
In addition, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 
ratified in 2000, notes a “need to increase the protection of children 
from involvement in armed conflict,” defining a child as “every human 
being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the 
child, majority is attained earlier.”86 The Optional Protocol also 
includes a clause in Article 4(1) that states: “Armed groups that are 
distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any 
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 
years.”87 Interestingly, this law distinguishes between children used as 
soldiers in state and non-state groups. It categorizes “with the gravest 
concern the recruitment, training and use within and across national 
borders of children in hostilities by armed groups distinct from the 
armed forces of a State.”88 
Next, the Rome Statute, adopted in 1998, states in Article 
8(2)(b)(xxvi) that “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age 
of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities” is a war crime.89 The Rome Statute 
created the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 as “an 
 
 84. G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 38, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989). 
 85. Id. at art. 38(2); see also Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449 
n.33 (pointing out that Article 38(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states: “State 
Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities”). 
 86. G.A. Res. A/RES/54/263, ¶ 7 (May 25, 2000); see also Panjabi, supra note 9, at 451 
(stating that the Geneva Convention also prohibits using children under age 15 from fighting in 
armed conflicts). 
 87. Id. at art. 4(1). 
 88. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 89. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (entered into force July 1, 2002), [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
This appears to be one of the first documents to distinguish a “child” from an “adult” based on 
age, which is an idea now carried followed by most States. 
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important new mechanism for implementing existing child 
protection standards.”90 
The International Labour Organization, in Convention No. 182, 
focused specifically on the worst forms of child labor, and categorized 
using children in hostilities as such. In Article 3(a), it detailed 
“compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” as one 
of the worst forms of child labor.91 This draws an interesting parallel 
between using children for labor within communities and within 
groups involved in armed conflict, both of which are 
deemed unallowable. 
Protocol II states in Part II, Article 4(3)(c) that “children who 
have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in 
the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.”92 
Article 77(2) of Additional Protocol I, which discusses the protection 
of children, states: “The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible 
measures in order that children who have not attained the age of 
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, 
they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces.”93 This 
law contains the same strong language as the Convention on the 
 
 90. The International Criminal Court and Children’s Rights, THE AM. NON GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-AMICC-
ICCnChildRights.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2016); see also Konge, supra note 8, at 45 (“[T]he Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) codified the approach to take in determining 
the law.”). 
 91. Int’l Lab. Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for 
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, art. 3(a) (June 17, 1999), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CO
DE:C182; see also Panjabi, supra note 9, at 451 (explaining that according to the International 
Labor Organization’s Convention No. 182, which was adopted in 1999, “[c]ompulsory 
recruitment of children is classified as one of the ‘worst forms of child labor’”). 
 92. http://cpwg.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/08/AP-I-and-II-to-the-
Geneva-Conventions.pdf; see also Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449 n.34 
(explaining that the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in Article 
4(3)(c) APII states, “[C]hildren who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be 
recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities”); id. at 449 
(stating that Article 4, in fact, specifically imposes obligations on ANSAs, by providing in Article 
4(1) that “[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under 
any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years”). 
 93. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, supra note 75; see also Ryngaert & Van de 
Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449 n.33 (stating that in “Art 77(2) AP I: ‘The Parties to the 
conflicts shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of 
fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from 
recruiting them into their armed forces’”). 
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Rights of the Child in mandating that parties “take all feasible 
measures” to keep children out of armed conflict. 
The United Nations Security Council’s adoption of Resolutions 
1539 and 1612 (in 2004 and 2005 respectively) has also been 
particularly effective in increasing awareness of the child soldier 
problem, “[c]alling for the establishment of a monitoring and reporting 
mechanism on children and armed conflict.”94 
These formal actions regarding the use of child soldiers illustrate 
the international community’s views on recruiting and using children 
in armed conflict. Although, again, not binding on ANSAs, these laws 
reflect the international community’s intolerance for the use of child 
soldiers, whether in a state or ANSA group. 
2. The international community has taken informal actions to prevent 
child soldiering 
Soft law illustrates other instances of the international community’s 
inclination to regulate the use of child soldiers, particularly in regard to 
ANSAs. Again, even though ANSAs are generally not bound by 
international law, they are involved in the use of child soldiers, and these 
rules exist in the international forum to help with that problem. These soft 
laws include Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms (MRMs), such as the 
one by the Secretary General to the UN Security Council, and other 
individual acts, including unilateral acts and Deeds of Commitment. 
MRMs are ways to watch and keep track of compliance by these 
armed groups. One MRM, established by the UN Security Council in 
2005, “monitors the conduct of all parties, whether State of non-
State, to a conflict listed in the most recent report of the Secretary-
General on children and armed conflict.”95 In this MRM, “action 
plans are designed in which armed groups commit themselves to 
halting the new recruitment of child soldiers and releasing already 
recruited child soldiers,”96 and currently there are “[twelve] action 
plans [that] have been adopted and [twenty] country situations, not 
necessarily conflicts, [which] are being monitored.”97 
 
 94. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 451. 
 95. See also Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 458–59. 
 96. Id. at 459. 
 97. Id. 
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Despite the challenges of soft law,98 various agreements with 
international organizations “seem to have had a positive effect on 
compliance.”99 There is some indication that “armed groups have sought 
to bind themselves by particular humanitarian law rules and there is 
evidence to suggest that this has affected their behavior.”100 
UNICEF, for example, has “provided care, technical guidance and, 
at times, financial support for the successful implementation of national 
programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.”101 
UNICEF supports their “intent to end child recruitment”102 through 
documents such as Deeds of Commitment similar to the one created by 
Geneva Call. The Karen National Union (KNU) of Burma, Myanmar, 
for example, “has signed a Deed of Commitment . . . 
with UNICEF.”103 
Other groups, such as the Chin National Front/Chin National 
Army (CNF/CAN) in 2009, have signed similar unilateral Deeds of 
Commitment “pledging not to recruit and use child soldiers.”104 In 
addition, the Kachin Independence Organisation/Kachin 
Independence Army (KIO/KIA) “[has] also indicated [its] 
 
 98. These soft laws can be difficult to implement because often the government will not 
allow the UN or other similar groups to gain close enough access to the ANSAs to make action 
plans. CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, CHANCE FOR CHANGE: ENDING THE RECRUITMENT AND USE 
OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN MYANMAR 29 (2013) [hereinafter CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L]. For 
example, KNU stated that they “sent a letter of invitation to the UN Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to visit . . . but there has not been a 
response.” GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 23–24. They report that their group does not use 
child soldiers, but that the Burmese national army does. Id. at 21. Similarly, JEM reports that 
“NGOs are unable to cooperate with JEM regarding protection of children, as they require 
government permission to do so.” Id. at 18. In their view, “[i]nternational organizations working 
in this field are reluctant to work with JEM as that will jeopardize their dealings with the 
Government of Sudan.” Id. 
 99. Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging 
Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 107, 
143 (2012). 
 100. Id. at 127. 
 101. U.N. INT’L CHILDREN’S EMERGENCY FUND, FACTSHEET: CHILD SOLDIERS 2–3. 
 102. CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, supra note 98, at 28. (“Some armed groups including 
the KNU/KNLA and the Karenni National Peoples Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) 
expressed their intent to end child recruitment by signing deeds of commitment not to 
recruit or use children in 2007.”). 
 103. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 23. 
 104. CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, supra note 98, at 28; id. at 28 n.151 (“A copy of the Deed 
of Commitment was transmitted by the CNF/CAN to the UN in March 2009 together with a 
request for assistance in its implementation.”). 
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willingness to sign [D]eeds of [C]ommitment not to use or recruit 
child soldiers.”105 
Deeds of Commitment are simply unilateral statements that are 
not inherently binding. However, they are analogous to unilateral 
statements by states. In some cases, those unilateral statements by 
states have been found to be binding.106 For example, France issued a 
statement that it would stop testing nuclear weapons,107 which was 
recognized as a unilateral statement in 1995 by the UN Security 
Council.108 The International Court of Justice later found that 
unilateral act to be binding.109 If ANSAs understand that concept and 
take on a Deed of Commitment voluntarily, knowing and intending 
that it would serve the same legal purpose of a state’s unilateral act by 
signifying the ANSA’s commitment to abide by international norms, 
the ANSA could be legally bound by such a statement.110 
III. THE PROBLEM: ANSAS AND CHILD SOLDIERS 
A. ANSAs are the Main Perpetuators of the Child Soldier Problem 
ANSAs, as previously defined, are non-governmental groups who 
are involved in armed conflict but “lack the capacity to become party 
 
 105. Id. at 28. 
 106. The International Court of Justice “indeed support[s] the proposition that a unilateral 
statement may bind a state when the statement expresses an intention to be bound which could in 
good faith be relied on by other states.” BENITO MÜLLER ET AL., UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS: 
THE MISSING LEGAL LINK IN THE BALI ACTION PLAN 6 (2010). 
 107.  Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Summary of the Summary of the Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 
(Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep., ¶ 33–35 (Dec. 20). 
 108. See France Will Not Lower Its Nuclear Guard, Vows President, FRANCE IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/France-will-not-lower-
its-nuclear. 
 109. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Summary of the Summary of the Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 
Rep. (Dec. 20); see also Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep., ¶ 46 (Dec. 20) 
(“It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or 
factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations.”) 
 110. See Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 143 (noting that “[t]here is some 
acceptance in the literature of the binding nature of unilateral declarations made by nonstate 
actors,” such as a Deed of Commitment); see also GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 
20 (stating that even though ANSAs do not have the ability to “become parties to relevant 
international treaties, and are generally precluded from participating in norm-making processes,” 
they still retain the ability to make unilateral statements, though they may not be binding). 
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to the relevant international treaties.”111 Recent ANSAs include JEM 
in Sudan,112 Boko Haram in Nigeria,113 the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC),114 and Al-Qaeda in Iraq,115 in addition 
to many others. Even though these groups are not state actors, they 
still may be supported by states in armed conflict.116 However, despite 
those associations and the fact that ANSAs “have no single ideological 
commitment,”117 they are all “outsiders” on the world stage, and most 
governments and the international community as a whole “reject them 
as legitimate political actors.”118 
ANSAs can be widely regarded as a physical manifestation of social 
problems, particularly because “they see themselves as representatives 
of distinct interests and may build on broad support within 
communities.”119 Intentionally using child soldiers, however, does not 
 
 111. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 5; see also Claudia Hofmann & Ulrich Schneckener, 
Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in State- and Peace-Building: Options and Strategies, 93 INT’L 
REV. OF THE RED CROSS 603, 604 (2011) (stating that in general, they can be “defined as 
distinctive organizations that are (i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their 
objectives and (ii) not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, 
presidential guards, police, or special forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of 
autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure”). 
 112. GENEVA CALL, Sudan, http://www.genevacall.org/country-page/sudan/ (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2016); see also GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, 
http://www.genevacall.org/who-we-are/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
 113. See Ahmed Rufai Abubakar, The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, in UNITED NATIONS 
SYSTEM STAFF COLLEGE, UNDERSTANDING A NEW GENERATION OF NON-STATE ARMED 
GROUPS 45–54 (2014) (ebook). 
 114. See Sarah Sensamaust, Non-State Actors in Colombia, Guatemala and Nicaragua, 8 J. 
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION, Nov. 2004, 
http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/8.2/feature/sensamaust.htm. 
 115. Iraq: Non-State Actors, RULE OF LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS PROJECT 
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/non-state_armed_groups.php?id_state=110 (last 
updated Apr. 13, 2012). 
 116. Jean d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and States 
in International Law: Introduction, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 49, 58 (“[S]tates may provide 
support to non-state actors, or non-state actors may provide support to . . . states, in violation 
of international law.”). 
 117. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7; see also GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 5 (Geneva Call 
itself stressed that “[A]NSAs are not monolithic; they have different motivations, structures, and 
competencies, and therefore generalizations should be avoided.”). They “differ widely in kind, 
displaying different forms of appearance, aims, and underlying motivations.” Hofmann & 
Schneckener, supra note 111, at 619. 
 118. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7. 
 119. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 604; see also Somer, supra note 53, at 
116 (stating that they are “intertwined with supportive communities”); GENEVA CALL, supra 
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appear to be one of the interests they represent. If fact, they generally 
view themselves as protectors of children.120 That is one of the most 
dangerous components of the child soldier problem. “[A]ssociation of 
children with ANSAs may be the best of bad options during conflict 
situations,”121 and the ANSA group might feel that they are doing the 
children a favor by taking them in. In ANSAs’ views, they are helping, 
not recruiting, children.122 
As mentioned, permitting these volunteers may lead to their use 
as actual soldiers.123 However, Jonathan Somer indicated that this 
risk can be mitigated by making it clear to ANSAs that the best 
interests of the child should be the guiding principle, and if they do 
have associated children, they should take extra precautions in their 
internal implementation systems to ensure that such children are not 
recruited or used in hostilities.124 
If ANSAs believe that they are taking children in and not using them as 
soldiers, then hopefully they would abide by this suggestion.  As another 
scholar stated, “no matter how noble the cause of any belligerent, it can 
never justify the use of children in hostilities or other violations against 
them.”125 However, this is unlikely to be an effective remedy to the 
problem of child soldiers. This solution is not concrete and reliable, and 
does not have the strength to force an ANSA group who is already not 
abiding by international norms to start complying. Finding a better 
solution with the power to change ANSA behavior is imperative. 
 
note 1, at 6 (stating that their views of themselves and their role in regard to child soldiers also 
illustrates that there are important nuances in the situation, which only make it more difficult). 
 120. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 6; see also Somer, supra note 53, at 113 (“One of the 
major realizations to come out of . . . consultations with ANSAs is that in many cases they 
consider themselves to be child protection actors.”); GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 6 (arguing 
that ANSAs consider themselves to have a “protection role” extending “well beyond the 
prohibition on the recruitment of children and their use in hostilities”). 
 121. Somer, supra note 53, at 116 (stating that some children simply may get involved 
because their parents are fighters in an ANSA community). 
 122. Id. (stating that some children simply may get involved because their parents are 
fighters in an ANSA community). 
 123. Id. at 117. 
 124. Somer, supra note 53, at 117. 
 125. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 4. 
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B. ANSAs are not Traditionally Subject to International Law 
Hard law does not bind ANSAs, as long as they are not considered 
“Parties,”126 and soft law, at best, might be persuasive.  If an ANSA 
could be considered a “Party” according to international law, then it 
would be much more likely that hard law would be binding on it. 
Whether soft law applies would be circumstantial depending on the 
ANSA’s willingness to participate. One scholar noted that “[a]t most, 
[ANSAs] have indirect horizontal obligations under a human rights 
treaty such as the Optional Protocol: States are under the international 
obligation to regulate, at the domestic level, the child recruitment 
practices of [ANSAs].”127 As mentioned, ANSAs do not have “the full 
extent of rights and obligations as States,”128 which could illustrate 
why they may not feel compelled to change their behavior in the 
international community. 
Further, “[a]s non-state entities, [ANSAs] cannot participate in 
the creation of the international legal norms regulating these issues, 
nor can they become parties to international treaties—yet efforts to 
improve the protection of civilians during armed conflict cannot 
afford to ignore ANSAs.”129 Despite their reluctance to conform to 
these current international standards, “the practice of the United 
Nations, as well as of other international and regional organizations 
shows that efforts are increasingly being made to hold ANSAs 
accountable at the international level for the violation of international 
norms.”130 Despite the lack of binding international law and the fact 
that ANSAs are not considered “Parties,” these efforts may become 
effective if implemented in a way that would be compelling to ANSA 
groups. In order to protect children involved in these conflicts, ANSAs 
must be held to a higher standard of complying with 
international norms. 
 
 126.  See supra Section III.A (discussing how ANSAs cannot become parties to 
international treaties). 
 127. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 449. 
 128. Bellal & Casey-Maslen, supra note 69, at 188. 
 129. Pauline Lacroix et al., Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in Mechanisms for Protection, 
37 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 10, 10 (2011). 
 130. Bellal & Casey-Maslen, supra note 69, at 176–77. 
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C. ANSAs are Unlikely to Voluntarily Conform to International Law 
on the Child Soldier Issue 
Despite the strong international opinion against using child 
soldiers, “[i]nternational efforts to curb the use of child soldiers by non-
state actors have had only limited success.”131 ANSAs might be reluctant 
to comply due to their distrust of the international community.132 One 
scholar opined that ANSAs may hesitate to negotiate with international 
organizations because they fear that the information they give might 
then “be used to take action against members of the ANSA or the 
ANSA itself.”133 
Although ANSAs could potentially be innocent in this problem, 
ANSAs might reject international standards because they do not agree 
with international views of the rights of children involved in armed 
conflict, and how violators of those international norms should be 
treated.134 Many ANSAs believe that “the applicable standards have 
largely been forged in the West and imposed upon the rest of the 
world.”135 Further, “[b]y labelling acts that are not contrary to 
international law as violations, the international community risks 
alienating ANSAs who genuinely feel they are protecting children.”136 
Because “many ANSAs are sensitive towards their perception of their 
role as child protection actors,”137 such improper labeling can be a 
dangerous way of engaging these groups. Because ANSAs cannot help 
create these international laws, they “may not feel bound to abide by 
rules that they have neither put forward nor formally adhered to.”138 
It is also possible that ANSAs do not participate in international 
humanitarian law because they are “simply not aware of 
their obligations.”139 
 
 131. David M. Rosen, Who Is a Child? The Legal Conundrum of Child Soldiers, 25 CONN. 
J. INT’L L. 81, 87 (2009). 
 132. See Bongard & Somer, supra note, 73 at 685 (supporting the idea that ANSAs may 
feel distrustful due to “the state-centric nature of international law” which “poses challenges 
when it comes to addressing [the behavior of ANSAs]”). 
 133. Pauline Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11–12. 
 134. See Rosen, supra note 13, at 8. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Somer, supra note 53, at 117. 
 137. Id. at 121. 
 138. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20. 
 139. Id. 
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Even when ANSAs do attempt to abide by these norms, their 
efforts often go unrecognized. At times, “international courts have 
. . . referred favorably to undertakings by armed groups,”140 but 
“nation states will not ordinarily grant recognition to rebel groups, 
even though there is considerable evidence that, when they do, both 
sides to a conflict are more likely to observe the laws of war.”141 One 
scholar opined that although international law requires that ANSAs 
avoid using child soldiers, “even if these groups were to strictly adhere 
to the laws of war, their efforts likely would yield no tangible rewards. 
They would still be considered criminals under domestic law and 
would receive no international recognition of the legitimacy of their 
causes.”142 This lack of recognition illustrates another reason why it is 
hard to engage ANSAs to comply with international laws.143 For these 
reasons, “laws banning recruitment have had little or no influence on 
the behavior of non-state actors.”144 
IV. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) 
UN representatives have attempted to negotiate with ANSAs, but 
have “found it very difficult to achieve progress.”145 Unsurprisingly, 
ANSAs generally “have a hostile view of the UN, are excluded from 
its proceedings, and have little or no stake in its decisions, which 
renders UN efforts at persuasion generally ineffective.”146 Other 
groups have proven more successful, primarily non-governmental 
organizations, or NGOs, such as Geneva Call.147 NGOs “have a strong 
capacity to influence public opinion . . . , to educate and raise 
awareness about certain issues, to lobby political decision-makers, and 
 
 140. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 143. 
 141. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 8. 
 145. Rosen, supra note 131, at 87. 
 146. Id. 
 147. One scholar offers the opinion that “[a] fine example of another organization that 
offers advisory services to [ANSAs]—and only [ANSAs] for that matter—is Geneva Call, which 
provides [ANSAs] which sign up to the ‘Deed of Commitment’ sound implementation advice.” 
Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 458. 
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to engage with diplomatically unacknowledged actors, such as non-
state armed actors without implying a political shift in their favour.”148 
Indeed, “NGOs’ long-term engagement in relevant fields often 
grants them a certain amount of trust even from [ANSAs].”149 They 
are known as “neutral and independent actors,” and “benefit from 
[that] reputation” even if not everyone perceives them that way.150 
This advantageously “puts [NGOs] into a position to act as a 
facilitator for specific issues.”151 NGOs have great potential to 
influence ANSAs to look toward and increase compliance with 
international humanitarian norms. 
Providing ANSAs an opportunity to commit to and abide by 
humanitarian law norms could also “improve compliance by the states 
they fight against.”152 This is noteworthy particularly because some 
states have been hesitant to sign humanitarian law instruments due to 
the lack of reciprocity by the ANSAs.153 This reluctance could be 
remedied by “[a]llowing armed groups to demonstrate formally their 
commitment to be bound, or to express their intention to comply with 
existing legal obligations”154 through NGOs. 
In order to help ANSAs, these NGOs “focus heavily on the 
transmission of information and knowledge, including technical 
knowledge, and aim to [empathetically] persuade armed actors”155 to 
comply with international norms. This approach is empathetic, 
flexible, and principle-oriented, and can adjust to varying situations of 
individual ANSAs.156 This will prove to be important because, due to 
 
 148. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618; see also Rosen, supra note 26, at 
296 (stating that NGOs have been “enormously influential in shaping the international legal 
treaties that seek to ban the use of child soldiers”). 
 149. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. But see id. at 617 (“NGOs usually lack the capacities to employ serious leverage 
and effective bargaining attempts. Their goals for an engagement of armed actors may also differ 
distinctly from those of states.”). 
 152. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 129. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618; see, e.g., GENEVA CALL, supra note 
1, at 18–19 (stating that one ANSA, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), has “invited 
numerous organizations to visit its areas to discuss adherence to child protection codes” and that 
it would welcome further training). 
 156. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618 (stating that because of the 
effectiveness of these techniques, “NGOs are in the fairly unique position of being able to 
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the unique situations of different ANSAs, various sticks and carrots 
may be needed to maximize compliance. Geneva Call utilizes its 
unique position as an NGO by intentionally approaching ANSAs to 
“provide a platform for . . . [them] to adhere to international 
norms.”157 The international community should find ways to 
incentivize ANSAs to sign and comply with the Deed of Commitment 
for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict. 
V. DEEDS OF COMMITMENT 
A Deed of Commitment is a mechanism created by Geneva Call 
to “allow . . . ANSAs to pledge to respect humanitarian norms and be 
held publically accountable for their commitments.”158 There are 
different types of Deeds of Commitment that all follow the same 
process.159 Geneva Call began offering a Deed of Commitment as a 
specific pledge to abstain from the use of anti-personnel (AP) 
landmines in 2000.160 This Deed has so far proven to be effective: as 
of 2015, forty-nine ANSAs have signed the Deed of Commitment 
banning AP mines,161 and compliance “has been good.”162 Scholars 
have argued, “the most important mechanism through which 
unilateral acts by [ANSAs] are created is . . . Geneva Call’s Deed 
of [C]ommitment.”163 
 
communicate with non-state armed actors independently of political circumstances”). But see 
GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that NGOs cannot directly interact with JEM 
regarding the protection of children in armed conflict, because government permission 
is  required). 
 157. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618. 
 158. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20. 
 159. Id. 
 160. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, supra note 15. 
 161. GENEVA CALL, What We Do, Landmine Ban, http://www.genevacall.org/what-we-
do/landmine-ban/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
 162. GENEVA CALL, Success Stories, http://genevacall.org/success-stories/ (last visited Sept. 
29,  2016). 
 163. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 447 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 127 (“For example, Geneva Call, a 
Geneva-based organization dedicated to engaging armed groups in respecting and adhering to 
humanitarian norms, created a Deed of Commitment on anti-personal mines that can be signed 
by ‘armed non-state actors.’”); GENEVA CALL, What We Do, Landmine Ban, supra note 161 
(suggesting that although there was a 1997 AP Mine Ban Convention to which seventy-five 
percent of the world’s states are a party, this does not apply to ANSAs, and thus does not give 
5.HAFEN.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  5:22 PM 
989 Incentivizing Armed Non-State Actors 
 1015 
After the success of the Deed banning AP landmines, Geneva Call 
expanded the reach of its Deeds of Commitment and created others 
to help ANSAs comply with other humanitarian norms.164 With 
Deeds, and in anticipation of similar success, a snowball effect can take 
place by “[a]llowing armed groups to agree to comply with 
humanitarian law norms [that] can also influence other armed groups 
to agree to comply with such norms, either directly through peer 
pressure or indirectly through example setting.”165 Arguably, as the 
reach of the Deeds expands, the number of signatories will 
correspondingly increase.166 This is an idea that has “particular 
promise,” especially because it appears that in terms of NGOs 
influencing armed groups, Geneva Call “remains the most 
influential actor.”167 
A. Geneva Call 
Members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
originally launched Geneva Call in March of 2000.168 It is a “neutral 
and impartial humanitarian non-governmental organization dedicated 
to engaging . . . [A]NSAs . . . towards compliance with the norms of 
international humanitarian law.”169 
Since its conception, it has “engaged in dialogue with some 90 
ANSAs worldwide.”170 Geneva Call “focuses on [A]NSAs that operate 
outside effective State control and that are primarily motivated by 
political goals, which include armed movements, de facto authorities, 
and internationally non-recognized or partially recognized States.”171 
 
them an opportunity to prove compliance with international humanitarian norms); supra Section 
IV.B (discussing Deeds of Commitment as unilateral acts) 
 164. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, supra note 15. 
 165. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 130 (“Geneva Call incorporates this 
potential for influence into its strategy for engagement.”). 
 166. See id. at 131 (Not only do Deeds of Commitment provide an opportunity for a group to 
prove to the international community that the group can abide by international humanitarian norms, 
but also that they can expand the foundation for engaging armed actors in the first place: “If several 
armed groups are involved in the same armed conflict, even if they are not formally related, links 
between them create the potential for peer influence”). 
 167. Id. at 131–32. 
 168. Somer, supra note 53, at 107. 
 169. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 32. 
 170. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, supra note 112. 
 171. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 32. 
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Geneva Call remains “dedicated to promoting respect by armed 
non-State actors (ANSAs) for international humanitarian norms in 
armed conflict and other situations of violence.”172 Although there are 
a variety of types of ANSAs, Geneva Call specifically directs its focus 
toward “organized armed entities involved in internal armed conflicts 
that are primarily motivated by political goals, operate outside State 
control and therefore lack legal capacity to become party to relevant 
international treaties.”173 It offers help to these groups in many ways, 
“such as providing advice on policy revision, organizing training 
workshops, and/or developing educational materials to help 
signatories disseminate their new policies to their rank and file.”174 It 
also “responds to requests from ANSAs to help build their knowledge 
of, and capacities to implement international humanitarian norms.”175 
Additionally, “[i]n some cases, Geneva Call brings in partner 
organizations to support ANSAs in the implementation of 
their commitments.”176 
B. Geneva Call and Deeds of Commitment 
1. The success of the Deed of Commitment banning land mines 
Geneva Call secured a successful foundation for their Deeds of 
Commitment through the Deed banning land mines. The success of 
the Deed may be due to “the organisation[‘s] . . . ‘inclusive approach,’ 
refraining from employing coercive means (such as ‘naming and 
shaming’) but seeking rather to achieve change through dialogue, 
persuasion and cooperation.”177 The fact that “[m]any of the 
signatories used anti-personnel mines before signing the Deed, 
[suggests] that the Deed has had some impact on their behavior.”178 
 
 172. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, supra note 112. 
 173. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20. 
 174. Id.; see also GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, supra note 112. 
 175. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, Mission, supra note 112. 
 176. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20. 
 177. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 10 (footnote omitted). The authors also noted, “[I]n 
its efforts to address the lack of ownership of humanitarian norms by ANSAs, Geneva Call has 
developed an innovative mechanism, the ‘Deed of Commitment.’” Id. 
 178. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 128. Since the Deed banning AP mines 
was implemented, “Geneva Call has reported a decline in the use of anti-personnel mines by 
signatories to the Deed and has facilitated the destruction of numerous stockpiles of mines.” Id. 
(citation omitted). 
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Furthermore, “the engagement of ANSAs in the AP mine ban has 
served as an entry point to highlighting the need to protect civilians 
from other abuses.”179 While these results were specifically noted in 
application to mine bans,180 the principles of the Deed of Commitment 
worked well enough to merit the creation of other Deeds.181 The Deed 
of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of 
Armed Conflict, for example, was launched in 2010.182 Although it 
does not yet have as many signatories as the Deed of Commitment 
banning landmines, it has great potential to make a meaningful 
international impact. 
2. Child soldiers and Geneva Call 
Addressing the international child soldier issue “is contemplated 
in the founding statute of Geneva Call.”183 The opportunity to begin 
work in that area arose when Geneva Call saw the positive effects from 
the Deed of Commitment on banning landmines, and “built on its 
successes . . . by developing a new Deed of Commitment in respect of 
child recruitment in armed conflict.”184 As part of this Deed, ANSAs 
can essentially issue a unilateral statement of their commitment to 
comply with international norms regarding the use of child soldiers.185 
In order to gauge interest in developing another Deed of 
Commitment, Geneva Call held a meeting with “44 high-level 
political and military representatives of 28 signatories and other 
ANSAs engaged by Geneva Call” regarding the effectiveness of the 
 
 179. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 10. Indeed, this original landmine Deed has provided 
an important framework for future Deeds, and illustrates a template for further international 
humanitarian success. 
 180. See GENEVA CALL, Landmine Ban, supra note 161 (stipulating that over 20,000 
stockpiled AP mines have been destroyed since signatories “cooperated in humanitarian 
mine action”). 
 181. Another scholar remarked that “[e]xperience with the Deed of Commitment Banning 
AP Mines demonstrates not only that ANSAs can make humanitarian commitments but that they 
can indeed co-operate in the scrutiny of their own compliance.” Bongard & Somer, supra note 
132, at 706. 
 182. GENEVA CALL, Deed of Commitment, supra note 15. 
 183. Somer, supra note 53, at 108. 
 184. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 448. 
 185. Id. at 446; see also id. at 448 (stating that this happens “under relevant legal 
instruments: two provisions of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Optional Protocol to the latter Convention, 
and the Paris Principles and Guidelines”) (footnotes omitted). 
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Deed banning land mines.186 Geneva Call found that “[w]hile there 
were different opinions on standards and the fairness of international 
interventions, there was consensus to support Geneva Call’s efforts to 
expand into the thematic area of children and armed conflict.”187 
Those in attendance agreed that the Deed “should aim towards a 
higher standard than the minimum imposed by international 
obligations, but should not necessarily validate international (that is, 
state) attempts to create different standards for ANSAs, as this could 
be a dangerous precedent.”188 Creating this new Deed was delicate 
and important, not just because of the differences between legal 
effects on states and ANSAs, but because a Deed of Commitment 
regarding children would be much more complex.189 
When it created the new Deed, Geneva Call aimed to “understand 
the perspectives of ANSAs and to feed this awareness into the 
drafting.”190 Geneva Call could already boast established relationships 
with ANSAs, and consequently “was in a unique position to gather 
these perspectives.”191 These prior relationships, and the fact that the 
Deed incorporated the views of ANSAs, helped maximize its 
potential success. 
There are significant differences in the Deed banning landmines 
and the Deed to protect child soldiers; most notably, the central 
component of the latter is living humans, which will require a “more 
complex and convoluted legal framework” and involves the agency of 
children192—including their “human rights, needs, and desires.”193 
Where land mines are inanimate objects, children “experience various 
vulnerabilities,” resulting in a more complex picture where they are 
directly influenced by the humanity of the situation.194 Jonathan 
Somer also noted that children are not passive actors, and that the 
 
 186. Somer, supra note 53, at 112. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 116 (footnote omitted). 
 189. Despite the dangers, it is hoped and expected that the “new Deed of Commitment 
brings us all one step closer to protecting children in vulnerable situations.” GENEVA CALL, supra 
note 1. 
 190. Somer, supra note 53, at 113. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 109. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Lacroix et. al., supra note 133, at 12. 
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intervention would need to be more immediate than it was in the 
earlier Deed.195 In order to accommodate for these differences, and to 
be most effective and efficient, the scope of the Deed is limited, and 
intentionally so.196 
The first signatories to the Deed of Commitment for the 
Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict were the 
Karenni National Progressive Party, or Karenni Army, and the New 
Mon State Party, or the Mon National Liberation Army from 
Burma/Myanmar.197 Signing the Deed provided them, and any other 
ANSAs who have or will sign, the “opportunity to formally express 
their agreement to abide by humanitarian norms and take ownership 
of these rules.”198 A signature alone does not “guarantee better respect 
of humanitarian norms but provides a useful tool to hold signatories 
accountable for their undertaking.”199 
Geneva Call helps monitor the compliance of the ANSA groups in 
three ways: 1) providing ANSAs with self-monitoring mechanisms and 
collecting reports; 2) independently monitoring ANSA compliance by 
obtaining “information from a range of third-party actors present on 
the ground (such as media, international and local organisations)”; 
and 3) monitoring through field missions, which are “undertaken by 
Geneva Call on a routine basis to follow up on implementation of the 
Deeds of Commitment or to verify compliance in the event of 
allegations of violations.”200 Although these monitoring mechanisms 
are in place, it is foundational and essential that Geneva Call engage 
ANSAs with the intent to sign and comply. 
In summary, a Deed of Commitment is a way for ANSAs to 
unilaterally pledge compliance to international norms.201 The previous 
success of Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment banning landmines 
indicates a likelihood for success in later Deeds, including the Deed of 
 
 195. Somer, supra note 53, at 109. 
 196. Id. at 115–16. 
 197. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, History, http://www.genevacall.org/who-we-
are/history/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2016). 
 198. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20. 
 199. Id. The Deed “has been developed in cooperation with [ANSAs,]” and because of 
that, the “chances of compliance by [ANSAs] rise considerably.” Ryngaert & Van de 
Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 450. 
 200. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20. 
 201.  See supra Section V.B. 
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Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of 
Armed Conflict.202 The previously established relationship between 
Geneva Call and ANSAs and the incorporation of ANSA perspectives 
into the formation of this Deed further indicate a likelihood of its 
success.203 However, as the use of child soldiers has not been 
completely eradicated, Geneva Call should look for ways to further 
engage ANSAs and increase their compliance with 
international norms.   
VI. ENGAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
Although the Deed of Commitment has begun implementation, 
Geneva Call still faces major challenges as it strives to maximize 
success. Most obviously, a substantial number of ANSAs have not yet 
become signatories to the Deed.204 The methodology of engaging 
ANSAs is one of the most important parts of the Deeds of 
Commitment. Geneva Call “will not engage ANSAs on the territory 
of concerned states if prohibited from doing so,” but “will engage 
ANSAs extraterritorially” without the states’ “permission if warranted 
by humanitarian concerns.”205 Further, it is central to Geneva Call’s 
ideals to implement the Deeds of Commitment through “an inclusive 
process that [seeks] the approval and support of ANSAs themselves” 
based on the “trust, relationships and reputation built up with the 
ANSAs.”206 Somer remarked that “[i]t is more important to get it right 
than to race towards a large number of signatories.”207 
Access to many ANSA groups is difficult because some are 
“fragmented,” resources are not unlimited, and states sometimes 
refuse to allow Geneva Call to negotiate with ANSAs.208 Also, some 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 450. 
 205. Somer, supra note 53, at 111; see also Bongard & Somer, supra note 132, at 689 
(stating that although “[e]ngaging ANSAs has not been without its challenges and 
controversy . . . Geneva Call has won international recognition and support for its efforts, 
notably from state parties to the Ottawa Convention, the UN, the European Union, and the 
African Union.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 206. Somer, supra note 53, at 109. 
 207. Id. at 120. 
 208. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 450. 
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ANSAs themselves are unwilling to cooperate or engage.209 In Somer’s 
eyes, a “lesson not yet learned is how to influence the behaviour of 
the most reluctant ANSAs.”210 The Deeds of Commitment themselves 
are effective, which means that they currently appeal to ANSAs. 
However, the possibility of engaging the reluctant ANSAs demands 
expanding and improving the methods used to engage these groups. 
A. Improving ANSA Engagement and Compliance 
Since ANSAs are not bound by international law, and because the 
Deeds of Commitment have proven successful, it is crucially important 
to encourage engagement and compliance with those Deeds. Geneva 
Call understands that “[i]n order to engage an ANSA, it is important 
to understand the factors that might influence it.”211 Although many 
mechanisms for enforcing compliance with international humanitarian 
norms have proven to be insufficient so far, Geneva Call’s experience 
with Deeds of Commitment has shown that “by taking an inclusive 
approach, ANSAs can be engaged in changing their behaviour without 
the threat or use of coercive means against them.”212 One of the first 
steps toward a common understanding is recognizing that ANSAs do 
not exist in a “political and social vacuum.”213 
Many ANSAs “do not share, or flatly reject, the cultural views 
about children or childhood held by the international community,”214 
specifically in regard to international child soldier standards. Some 
ANSAs “believe that the applicable standards have been created in 
Western societies and imposed upon the rest of the world.”215 Another 
issue is that some ANSAs are simply terrorist organizations which have 
“publicly demonstrated little or no interest in observing the laws of 
war.”216 This ANSA disinterest in, and antagonism toward, 
international norms starkly highlights Geneva Call’s accomplishment 
in creating a Deed of Commitment with which signatories continue 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Somer, supra note 53, at 121. 
 211. Lacroix et. al., supra note 133, at 11. 
 212. Id. at 12. 
 213. Id. at 11. 
 214. Rosen, supra note 131, at 86. 
 215. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 216. Id. at 86–87 (footnote omitted) (“Many of these groups ignore both the domestic 
laws of their own countries and international law.”). Id. at 87. 
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to comply even if they may not agree with every nuance of the 
international standards. 
Geneva Call regards its Deeds as binding, “as do the signatories 
themselves.”217 Thus, signing the Deed boosts ANSA legitimacy.218 
The Deed was created with “built-in provisions on implementation 
and monitoring.”219 Importantly, since there is not a “one-size-fits-all 
solution as each ANSA operates in a unique manner” it is essential that 
the Deed’s language and processes are tailored to each group.220 
Many of the Law of Armed Conflict violations by ANSAs might 
be “due to a lack of actual knowledge of the content,” and in that 
sense, participation in the Deed of Commitment can also educate 
ANSAs about international humanitarian norms.221 This educational 
opportunity is likely already currently incentivizing some ANSAs, 
particularly if they would like to be legitimate political actors but only 
have limited options for learning international law. Geneva Call 
“provides ANSAs the opportunity to become part of an international 
humanitarian mechanism”222 through signing a Deed of 
Commitment, and compliance is of the utmost importance. 
Although compliance is good once ANSAs sign a Deed of 
Commitment, one major difficulty is enticing ANSA groups to sign in 
the first place. Currently, there is no foolproof mechanism for 
engaging ANSAs. One scholar remarked that “[t]hrowing money at 
passive recipients only turns them into mendicants and wastes the 
funds.”223 Gaining successful ANSA compliance likely needs 
improvements that progress step-by-step,224 and in regard to child 
soldiers, this could involve engaging ANSAs according to their 
own standards.225 
Indeed, with a problem as complex as children in armed conflict, 
“[i]t is wishful thinking to expect that any single tool . . . can 
 
 217. Roberts & Sivakumaran, supra note 99, at 143 (footnote omitted). 
 218. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 448. 
 219. Somer, supra note 53, at 118. 
 220. Id. at 118–19. 
 221. Anton O. Petrov, Non-State Actors and Law of Armed Conflict Revisited: Enforcing 
International Law through Domestic Engagement, 19 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 279, 299 (2014). 
 222. Somer, supra note 53, at 120. 
 223. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 461. 
 224. Somer, supra note 53, at 122. 
 225. Id. 
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maximize protection on its own.”226 Two scholars, Hofmann and 
Schneckener, opined that due to past experience, flexibility is 
essential.227 Arrangements that are appropriately flexible will likely 
involve a mix of enforcements and incentives, or sticks and carrots, 
which “allows international organizations to apply some leverage in 
negotiations with non-state armed actors, either by punishing them (for 
example, through economic sanctions or naming and shaming) or by 
rewarding them.”228 Indeed, deciding which norms will interest ANSAs 
in compliance is a long-term process.229 In order to be sustainable, 
methods of engaging ANSAs to comply will likely be adjustable, and 
will probably involve a mixture of sticks (sanctions) and 
carrots (incentives).230 
Although it appears that Geneva Call is more inclined to utilize 
carrots than sticks, the most effective methodology for engaging 
ANSAs may involve any number of both. At this point, Geneva Call 
has not shown one method to be any more successful than another. 
The following sections will discuss how Geneva Call and other NGOs 
could further use sticks and carrots to encourage ANSA compliance 
with international norms regarding child soldiers through signing 
Deeds of Commitment. 
B. Sticks 
Sticks are methods of enforcing behavior, and might be used as 
compelling ways to persuade ANSAs to sign and comply with Deeds 
of Commitment. One danger of engaging ANSAs is the possibility 
that “some [ANSAs] will attempt to take a free ride on the positive 
publicity generated by signing up to a Deed, without ever having had 
 
 226. Id.; see also id. at 123 (stating that Geneva Call has remarked that it is “convinced that 
when the stick doesn’t cut the mustard—in other words, when a punitive approach does not 
prove effective—it is a good thing that other methodologies exist which attempt to 
comprehensively protect children under the control or influence of ANSAs”); see also Hofmann 
& Schneckener, supra note 111, at 610 (stating that “in most instances, these strategies are not 
used exclusively but in combination”). 
 227. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 606. 
 228. Id. at 615. In the eyes of Geneva Call, “engaging ANSAs is a long-term effort: it 
involves constructive and sustained dialogue to persuade them to sign the Deed of Commitment, 
and continues after signature through supporting its implementation and monitoring 
compliance.” Bongard & Somer, supra note 132, at 686. 
 229. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 618–19. 
 230. Id. at 610. 
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the intention to genuinely respect [International Humanitarian 
Law].”231 Although using incentives rather than enforcement might 
seem kinder, exclusively using carrots and disregarding sticks would 
likely be ineffective. In situations where carrots would come up short 
or appear too soft to truly be compelling, certain stick methods would 
add compulsion and might prove helpful, or even necessary. Further, 
not all ANSA groups are the same or act based on similar motivations. 
Having a variety of methods for enforcing or incentivizing compliance 
would present a greater platform for far-reaching success. The 
following five options provide an overview of some possible stick 
options for enforcing compliance with Deeds of Commitment. 
1. Monitoring and reporting mechanisms (MRMs) 
MRMs use reporting to put political pressure on groups who 
violate norms by neglecting to comply with their commitments.232 
This kind of pressure represents soft law, and could be used as a stick 
in compelling ANSAs to comply with Deeds of Commitment. 
However, because ANSAs “complain that there is no possibility of 
refuting allegations of violations, and that the system is not particularly 
accessible to them,”233 this may not be a particularly effective option 
to increase ANSA compliance with Deeds of Commitment. 
2. Investigations and sanctions, or prosecution 
Geneva Call typically does not use sanctions, but they might be 
worth investigating as a constructive possibility for enforcing 
compliance with Deeds of Commitment. Particularly if the idea of 
sanctions as a method of compliance has not yet been tried, it may 
prove effective for some ANSA groups to be persuaded by the threat 
of sanctions. In any case, the potential for expanding success due to a 
yet-unproven method would be worth investigating sanctions. If 
ANSAs prove to be non-compliant, then it may be beneficial to have 
that lead to “the enforcement of targeted sanctions through states.”234 
 
 231. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 450–51. 
 232. Id. at 459. 
 233. Id. at 460. 
 234. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 616. 
5.HAFEN.FIN2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  5:22 PM 
989 Incentivizing Armed Non-State Actors 
 1025 
Geneva Call currently has a mild sanctioning policy in place.235 If 
ANSA signatories do not comply, they “agree to cease violations 
immediately and to initiate appropriate investigations and sanctions in 
accordance with international standards.”236 If that does occur, then the 
only sanction that Geneva Call does potentially foresee is to possibly 
“publicize non-compliance in case of confirmed violations,”237 which 
could happen through law enforcement at a national or perhaps even 
international level.238 However, this could be built upon by enforcing 
graver sanctions. For example, “for recalcitrant [ANSAs] harsher but 
‘smart’ sanctions—travel bans, arms embargoes, the freezing of assets—
may perhaps have to be contemplated.”239 
This “fear of prosecution could constitute an incentive for ANSA 
leaders and commanders to ensure that their practices are in 
conformity with international norms, therefore easing the work of an 
organisation willing to engage them.”240 If sanctions do incentivize 
ANSAs to comply with international norms and to become signatories 
to a Deed, then perhaps it would be worth investigating sanctions as 
a real possibility. Using sanctions rather than MRMs as a stick is more 
likely to compel ANSA groups to comply with their commitment to 
international norms, particularly if the sanctions are tailored 
specifically to their wants and needs. 
3. Political pressure, and naming and shaming 
Another possible stick would be reducing the freedom of ANSAs—
forcing political pressure on them if they do not abide by signed Deeds 
of Commitment. Hofmann and Schneckener suggested implementing 
this pressure by putting ANSAs under “strict surveillance (by using 
police and intelligence measures).”241 They continued by pointing out 
that ANSAs themselves “by and large remain dependent on other 
actors, such as international organizations and states, to provide the 
 
 235. Somer, supra note 53, at 119. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Bongard & Somer, supra note 132, at 688. 
 238. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 608. 
 239. Ryngaert & Van de Meulebroucke, supra note 72, at 459. 
 240. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 11. 
 241. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 609. 
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required resources and political pressure”242 for them to function. 
Assuming that is the case, it could be very debilitating to ANSAs to have 
those resources and political pressure apply negatively. 
Similarly, one of the most obvious sticks used to enforce 
compliance is naming and shaming. This is akin to putting political 
pressure on ANSAs, because it “organize[s] social pressure and . . . 
campaign[s] publicly, at the national and the international level, 
against certain practices of non-state armed actors in order to harm 
their legitimacy.”243 This stick option might prove too commonplace, 
especially for ANSAs who likely already feel political pressure and 
naming and shaming, to effectively motivate compliance with a Deed 
of Commitment. 
4. Delegitimization 
Deligitimizing ANSAs could also be particularly potent as a stick. 
The process of delegitimization generally destroys the authority of a 
group.244 For groups such as ANSAs, who are likely looking to gain 
political recognition, this could be extremely detrimental, and thus 
might prove to be very effective in enforcing compliance with a Deed 
of Commitment. The proper balance of delegitimizing while still 
engaging these groups might be hard to find, however, because at this 
point it is possible that ANSAs do not have much legitimacy in the 
eyes of states anyway. Delegitimization would not be much of a threat 
if ANSAs feel that they don’t have anything to lose. However, using 
child soldiers might push the legitimacy level of an ANSA group so far 
in a negative direction that it would be an effective method of 
enforcement. If ANSAs prioritize becoming legitimate in order to 
realize their aims, then delegitimization could be a heavy threat,245 and 
thus could be a very good option for a stick in terms of Deed of 
Commitment compliance. 
 
 242. Id. at 619. 
 243. Id. at 612. 
 244. Definition of Delegitimize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/delegitimize (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 245. Hart, supra note 10, at 222 (stating that “[f]or the United States and its allies, the 
issue of child recruitment may be invoked to delegitimize state or non-state actors that are 
construed as enemies in the post-9/11 War on Terrorism”). 
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5. Political isolation 
One final stick is to marginalize and politically isolate ANSAs even 
further than they already are in order to reduce their “political and 
ideological influence.”246 Essentially, this idea would be to “marginalize 
their worldviews and demands in public discourse and to isolate them—
politically as well as physically—from actual or potential followers and 
their constituencies.”247 If ANSA groups aim to gain political followers, 
then political isolation would be extremely damaging to those goals. 
This could be very effective in enforcing compliance with international 
norms, and would likely be successful as a stick in enforcing compliance 
with a Deed of Commitment. 
For some ANSA groups, sticks might prove more threatening, and 
thus more effective, than other carrot options. One or a combination 
of the five stick options could be successful enforcement. These 
options overall are likely more realistic than most carrot options, 
although as mentioned, other than sanctions, Geneva Call has 
historically gravitated toward carrots, rather than sticks. However, 
here again it is worth noting that the highest possible likelihood of 
successful compliance would be gained by a combination of sticks and 
carrots. By utilizing both, the reach of and lasting compliance with the 
Deeds of Commitment would encompass more ANSA groups who 
might be motivated by a variety of methods. Engaging ANSAs and 
continuing their compliance with Deeds of Commitment is crucial, as 
it is the only viable way to convince ANSAs to stop using child soldiers. 
C. Carrots 
Despite the potential effectiveness of some stick methodology, 
“[i]n some cases, [ANSAs] may be more willing to engage with a 
carrot-based approach.”248 They are not simply unbiased actors, but 
rather engaged ones. As with any human actor, providing attractive 
incentives will likely help ANSAs comply with Deeds of Commitment. 
Carrots, as incentives, naturally appear more enticing than sticks. It is 
possible that using only carrots would still gain the compliance of 
many ANSA groups for that reason. The following are several options 
of possible incentives. 
 
 246. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 609. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Somer, supra note 53, at 121. 
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1. Ceasefires, negotiations, and peace agreements 
There is a possibility that simple ceasefires, negotiations, peace 
agreements, or some combination thereof will be attractive enough to 
ANSAs to encourage Deed of Commitment compliance.249 Hofmann 
and Schneckener point out that “many non-state armed actors are 
indeed driven by certain grievances and political demands, which can 
be addressed through negotiations and/or other means.”250 Even 
negotiating with Geneva Call could be an avenue for ANSAs to 
communicate better with state actors. Evidence of cooperation might 
glean a favorable reaction from states as well.251 It is also plausible that 
better communication with state actors is a goal of ANSA groups, 
especially if it would further their political or social aims. If that proves 
true, then negotiations could be an attractive carrot. This option 
would also be attractive to states, because they could likewise 
communicate with ANSA groups, and further, their children would 
then not be involved in armed conflict. However, these solutions are 
technically already open options, and so the fact that many ANSAs 
continue to use child soldiers probably indicates that this carrot would 
not be powerful enough on its own to ensure Deed of 
Commitment compliance. 
2. Recognition of partial compliance 
Partial compliance may be a good carrot in cases where it may not 
be possible for ANSAs to comply with every aspect of a Deed of 
Commitment. In fact, ANSAs simply may not know how to comply 
with every component.252 One Geneva Call scholar stated: “Although 
 
 249. See Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 610 (arguing that “ceasefires, 
confidence-building measures, and peace agreements, as well as mechanisms for conflict 
settlement and arbitration” could prove effective). 
 250. Id. at 611; see also id. at 617 (“A coalition of states may act as a ‘group of friends’ or 
‘contact group’, [sic] engaging in conflict management and conflict mediation in 
specific cases.”). 
 251. There would be no guarantee that cooperation would gain the approval of states. For 
example, even in regard to Geneva Call’s negotiations and trainings with ANSAs within state 
boundaries, “[s]ometimes governments are favorable, at times reluctant and very few [even] refuse 
access.” GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20. 
 252. Katharine Fortin, Geneva Call Report: Perceptions of Armed Non-State Actors on 
Humanitarian Action, ARMED GROUPS AND INT’L LAW (May 24, 2016), 
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the ANSAs consulted express support for [International Humanitarian 
Law], their comprehension of relevant rules on humanitarian access is 
limited.”253 In any situation, there will be a learning curve for the 
ANSA group as they begin to change their practices to comply. As a 
result, compliance is virtually impossible as an overnight goal, and 
ANSAs will need time to implement the ideals to which they agreed 
by becoming a signatory. 
Eric Jensen suggested a system of recognizing partial compliance. 
He remarked, “intermediate levels of recognition for partial 
compliance” can prove useful in that they “provide incentives . . . to 
comply with international law without eroding the maximum benefits 
offered to those who comply with all requirements.”254 Rather than 
incentivizing only complete compliance, it might be beneficial to lower 
compliance requirements, or at least allow time for the behavioral 
changes to take place. However, the international community may be 
wary of the possibility of lessening the incentive for complete 
compliance.255 If the ANSA groups do not sign right away, “rather 
than opting for an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach, Geneva Call maintains 
dialogue with such groups,”256 and a lower or partial recognition of 
compliance could result in more signatories. In addition, if ANSAs 
were willing to completely comply with rules regarding child soldiers, 
even if they are not completely complying with all the law of armed 
conflict rules, then perhaps they could get partial benefits from the 
law of war. This carrot option might be effective in terms of initially 
engaging ANSAs, but would not be a long-term solution to 
compliance, because it would allow for partial cooperation, which 
might never turn into full cooperation with a Deed of Commitment. 
The ultimate goal should be to completely abide by international 
humanitarian norms regarding child soldiers. 
 
https://armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2016/05/24/geneva-call-report-perceptions-of-
armed-non-state-actors-on-humanitarian-action/. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It is Time for Intermediate Levels of Recognition 
for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 209, 213–14 (2006). 
 255. Id. at 229. 
 256. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 11. 
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3. Economic bribery 
Economic bribery, while an appealing incentive to virtually 
anyone, can be both bad and good as a carrot. Money can be a 
powerful motivator, especially for groups such as ANSAs that lack 
resources. Essentially, “if one is able to put enough pressure on them 
and/or offer them some profits, these people will ultimately 
comply.”257 However, the danger would arise if these groups used the 
funds for negative purposes, or simply took the money without fully 
committing to comply. Some sort of safety measure could be put in 
place to prevent those effects, such as a tracking or reporting method 
for the money. That might not be effective, however, because if the 
money were used but not reported, then it would be difficult to track. 
Similarly, but perhaps more effectively, another form of economic 
bribery could be to deposit the money into an escrow for post-conflict 
resources. Money could be released if an ANSA proved its compliance 
with the Deed of Commitment. It would likely not be beneficial to 
have a fund like this run by the state, since that could be another 
source of tension between the ANSAs and the states. Instead, Geneva 
Call, or a different reliable third party, could govern the fund, and 
money could be fairly distributed through them.  The administering 
party would be restricted to releasing the funds only upon certain 
contractually-determined events. The idea of economic bribery makes 
a good carrot, but the practical application is more difficult—where 
would the money come from? That complication makes this carrot less 
enticing as an incentive for Deed of Commitment compliance. 
4. Social and community bribery 
Bribery as a carrot can also be effective in a social and community 
form. At this point, most ANSAs, if not all, “have some sort of 
constituency or derive support from the communities where they 
originate.”258 Indeed, many ANSAs indicated that children live with 
their families in combatant communities that are a part of the 
groups.259 These groups are likely the primary provider of social 
structure and community support. Because of this, one scholar has 
 
 257. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 610. 
 258. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 11. 
 259. See generally, GENEVA CALL, supra note 1. 
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said that “sensitisation of such . . . communities has proven 
instrumental in bringing pressure on ANSAs, and consequently 
bringing about positive change in their behaviour.”260 Gaining the 
support of the community to pressure the ANSA group to comply 
might prove difficult, but would ultimately be pivotal.261 In fact, it 
might also be possible that the community is “supportive” in the same 
way that some children “volunteer”—only due to the ANSAs threat 
of force. In that case, it might be easier than expected to utilize the 
community’s support to motivate ANSA groups, and might also be a 
sort of rescue to those community members as well as to the child 
soldiers. However, as with many actions that require support of the 
community, the drawback of this carrot would be that it might be 
difficult to gain enough support. This would certainly deter this 
method of incentivizing compliance with a Deed of Commitment. 
5. Immunity 
Immunity in international court proceedings could also be a 
carrot. If they should ever be prosecuted, ANSA groups could gain 
immunity through compliance. Immunity is a powerful incentive, and 
can be instrumental in bringing about complete compliance.262 Partial 
compliance, while a good step, “does not merit complete privilege,”263 
and so as a general rule, immunity should not be granted as a complete 
benefit to ANSAs who only partially comply.264 If ANSAs are 
concerned that signing a Deed of Commitment would result in 
prosecution for not previously abiding by international norms, then 
this option could be appealing as an incentive. Offering immunity 
would require extensive coordination with domestic governments and 
the international community, though, so it may not be feasible 
without a considerable amount of work. The extensive political 
coordination needed to arrange immunity would likely be reserved for 
very large ANSAs. Alternatively, because there are so many discrete 
 
 260. Lacroix et al., supra note 133, at 11. 
 261. One challenge to gaining support would be if the community had antagonistic views 
toward ANSAs, and would just as soon outcast those groups as help with their compliance. 
Another difficulty might be that the community would simply prefer to watch passively rather 
than make an effort to act, which would not provide any positive community motivation for the 
ANSAs to comply. Antagonism and indifference could both be very detrimental. 
 262. Jensen, supra note 254, at 234. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
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ANSAs, the transaction costs of arranging immunity for such small 
groups may ultimately be prohibitive. This would be a carrot that 
would be very effective for some groups, but hardly effective for others 
in considering Deed of Commitment compliance. 
6. Amnesty 
Similar to the idea of immunity is the possibility of amnesty. Where 
immunity would allow the ANSAs to be insusceptible to prosecution, 
amnesty would grant a pardon. Some scholars have remarked that 
“tools for reconciliation processes and transitional justice . . . may be 
linked with amnesty provisions for leaders and members of armed 
groups if they participate in the investigation of war crimes and human 
rights violations, regret their past actions believably, and want to 
change their behaviour.”265 Although amnesty might contradict 
demands for justice, it also may “serve as an incentive to end violence 
and to refrain from using violence in the future.”266 It can be difficult 
for child soldiers to see their former leaders on trial because of lasting 
emotional and psychological effects of their involvement with the 
ANSA group, and thus their freedom from being forced to participate 
in armed conflict could justify using amnesty as a carrot. Although this 
carrot sounds ideal in helping to increase compliance with Deeds of 
Commitment, it might be more difficult in actual application if states 
were reluctant to grant it. 
7. Self-monitoring privileges 
Another potentially effective carrot to incentivize Deed of 
Commitment compliance would be to offer ANSAs the privilege of 
monitoring themselves. Since one major concern for ANSAs is privacy 
and avoiding a breach of trust,267 incentivizing compliance by offering 
ANSAs the privilege of monitoring themselves may be an attractive 
option. Indeed, “[w]hile no one should be naïve enough to accept 
 
 265. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 613. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11–12 (“[I]t may be that ANSAs would be less likely 
to accept dialogue, or to negotiate in good faith with such an organisation, fearing that they 
might share the information obtained (either voluntarily or following a summons by the court 
or tribunal), which could then be used to take action against members of the ANSA or the 
ANSA itself.”). 
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that self-monitoring would be adequate on its own, its virtues should 
not be ignored.”268 One scholar remarked, “[Self-monitoring] can 
strengthen a sense of ownership towards the implementation 
process—[which is] especially important for ANSAs, who generally are 
excluded from formation of norms—and the process of self-critical 
reflection, including the sharing of good practice, can result in new 
measures to improve compliance with substantive obligations.”269 
Raising international expectations of ANSAs by treating them as 
groups capable of monitoring themselves could be a good option. 
ANSAs groups would likely find self-monitoring attractive due to the 
appeal of privacy and the opportunity to act autonomously. However, 
one potential problem with this is that ANSA groups may give false 
reports, which might deter the international community from being 
inclined to use this option. Ultimately, however, self-monitoring 
should be an attractive idea—if the international community cannot 
trust ANSAs to comply with a unilateral statement such as a Deed of 
Commitment, how can it expect ANSAs to take the next, and much 
larger step, of abiding by international humanitarian norms? Self-
monitoring as a means of incentivizing compliance is an option 
worth exploring. 
8. Training through Geneva Call 
To remedy the potential problem that ANSAs simply do not know 
how to comply, and also as a possible carrot, NGOs such as Geneva 
Call could offer training to these groups.270 Because “[a]rmed actors 
will undergo processes of collective learning, which will alter strategies 
and, eventually, their self-conception,”271 it is important to provide 
ways for them to successfully rebuild their groups. If Geneva Call 
could provide a framework for ANSAs to “accept basic norms and 
critically reflect their self-image and their actions,” which could be 
done through encompassing “empathy for victims, the confession of 
guilt, and public remorse,” then this carrot could be a very effective 
method of compliance.272 Moreover, Geneva Call’s success in 
 
 268. Somer, supra note 53, at 119. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See Bongard & Somer, supra note 73, at 686. 
 271. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 612. 
 272. Id. at 613. 
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engaging273 and commitment to training ANSAs already274 point 
toward the success of this carrot in initially engaging them. 
9. NGOs as mediators 
Further, NGOs could not only provide training, but could act as 
a vehicle for ANSAs to prove their compliance. The use of NGOs as 
mediators could be an attractive carrot for increasing Deed of 
Commitment compliance. For example, ANSAs could piggy-back on 
the good reputation of Geneva Call, making Geneva Call a placeholder 
or mediator in the international community. One of the biggest 
sources of leverage for NGOs such as Geneva Call is their influence on 
local and international public opinion.275 Because of their ability to 
affect public opinion, Geneva Call could help ANSAs establish an 
improved international reputation. 
Generally, “ANSAs often lack the necessary resources, capacity and 
equipment to implement their obligations under the [Deeds of 
Commitment].”276 Geneva Call, on the other hand, has a strong 
international reputation. It is already in a good position to act as a 
mediator, could educate external actors on how to best comply, and, 
in turn, could educate the states about non-state armed actors. This 
could be a good incentive for ANSAs to work with Geneva Call and 
agree to a Deed of Commitment. Using Geneva Call as a mediator 
would necessitate that Geneva Call keep a virtually flawless reputation. 
However, because helping child soldiers is one of its aims, it would 
presumably be keeping a good reputation in the eyes of the 
international community already in order to further that goal,277 and 
would also likely be eager to help by acting as a mediator. This carrot 
could be fairly easy to implement, which would make it an effective 
way to increase compliance with Deeds of Commitment. 
 
 273. See supra Section V.B. 
 274. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra note 20. 
 275. See Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 619. 
 276. Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11. 
 277. Geneva Call’s clean reputation is evidenced by the way that they operate as an 
organization. They operate in a way that gains the trust of not only ANSA groups but also state 
actors. For example, their attitude toward the governments on whose territory they are 
interacting with ANSAs is one of transparency and communicating information. Governments, 
particularly those of countries dealing with armed conflict, would not likely trust or allow access 
to an organization with a negative reputation. The fact that very few governments refuse Geneva 
Call access indicates the favorability of their reputation. GENEVA CALL, Who We Are, FAQs, supra 
note 20. 
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10. Increasing ANSA legitimacy 
Signing the Deed of Commitment protecting children from 
armed conflict would allow ANSAs to prove to the international 
community that they can contribute in a humane and sophisticated 
way to public international forums and abide by international 
humanitarian norms. In other words, legitimizing ANSA groups could 
be a very attractive carrot. Compliance would be an opportunity for 
ANSA groups to build their own accountability in the international 
community. The assumption that “non-state armed actors can be 
affected by norms and arguments because many of them are 
concerned with their public image . . . and their sources of 
legitimacy”278 supports the idea that this would be an effective 
incentive. One scholar even suggested that a higher measure of success 
can be obtained when “local populations,” or in this case ANSAs, “will 
have to invest a great deal of themselves in this plan to prove their 
worth before the rest of the world commits to them,”279 because that 
investment will bring good international returns. ANSAs, if nothing 
else, surely would comply to gain legitimacy, since that often appears 
to be a primary aim.280 However, since states are so resolute in keeping 
that aim from them, there is also the risk that this incentive might be 
difficult to offer. Thus, this carrot would be somewhat effective for 
enforcing compliance with Deeds of Commitment but might prove 
difficult to implement. 
11. Similar treatment to states 
In the eyes of ANSAs, “legitimacy” could simply mean receiving the 
same treatment as states. This could be an extremely effective carrot as 
well. Though Somer stated that “[f]urther norms of customary 
[International Humanitarian Law] require all parties to conflict to 
provide children with the aid and care they require,”281 one potential 
problem is that these norms are “convoluted and inconsistent . . . 
 
 278. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 613. 
 279. Panjabi, supra note 9, at 461. 
 280. See AOIFE MCCULLOUGH, THE LEGITIMACY OF STATES AND ARMED NON-STATE 
ACTORS 2 (2015), http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Legitimacy.pdf 
(stating that non-state actors seek to “gain legitimacy through a range of strategies”). 
 281. Somer, supra note 53, at 110. 
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especially the way in which they treat ANSAs differently than states with 
regard to use and recruitment.”282 
There is a basic idea that “non-state armed actors, and in particular 
their respective leaderships, can be . . . slowly integrated into a 
political setting, [perhaps] by distributing resources and sharing 
political responsibility.”283 This approach would “impl[y] a certain 
degree of informal or formal power-sharing, be it at national or local 
level, which would involve leaders of armed groups in day-to-day 
politics.”284 If reciprocity were guaranteed, ANSAs might be more 
likely to abide by international norms.285 To the credit of ANSAs, 
“Geneva Call’s experience shows that there are indeed cases where 
ANSAs commit to humanitarian norms without reciprocity by 
states.”286 Because ANSAs would prefer to have the same privileges as 
states, but are willing to sign a Deed of Commitment even without 
those privileges, offering this incentive could cause a significant 
increase in signatories to the Deed. However, similar to the risks of 
offering legitimacy, there is certainly a risk that domestic governments 
and the international community would not be willing to extend this 
as an incentive. Despite the potential positive effects regarding child 
soldiers, states might fear that giving ANSAs too much political power 
would cause of further political unrest and armed conflict. This carrot 
might not be the most effective for encouraging compliance with a 
Deed of Commitment. 
12. Helping with law-making and rebuilding the state 
Another carrot would be to allow ANSAs to help with law-
making. Many of those fighting groups “do not participate in 
international lawmaking because [it] is still the exclusive domain of 
sovereign states.”287 Many of the states in which ANSAs reside have 
governments that are arguably corrupt or non-functional.288 Assuming 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 611. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Rosen, supra note 13, at 7. 
 288. See GENEVA CALL, Armed Non-State Actors, http://genevacall.org/how-we-
work/armed-non-state-actors/ (last visited Sep. 30, 2016). 
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that those states would need to be rebuilt anyway, perhaps there would 
be merit in letting ANSAs participate in the rebuilding and the 
creation of norms. 
As one scholar stated, “The concept is that the objects of 
obligations should be the subjects of the norm-creation. As 
international law traditionally addressed only States, it was justified 
that only States were law-makers.”289 At this point, “contemporary 
international law increasingly obliges private actors[, which] would 
call for participation of these actors in the norm-creation,” and 
further, the law of armed conflict imposes obligations directly on 
ANSAs, which would suggest that they should be involved in making 
international laws,290 or at least laws affecting them. Is it just to require 
ANSAs to abide by rules in which they have no say?291 Because of the 
nature of sovereignty, however, the opportunity to participate in the 
rebuilding of the state would likely need to be awarded by the state 
itself, which could prove extremely difficult. 
Even if ANSAs could not directly create laws, it could be enough 
to simply award them an advisory role in international processes.292 If 
an ANSA desired such a role, it would need to abide by the Deed of 
Commitment and humanitarian norms, because otherwise it would be 
highly unlikely, perhaps impossible, that states would allow it to take 
on an advisory role, much less participate in the actual law-making. 
One scholar points out two advantages to this method of engaging 
ANSAs in compliance: first, by allowing them to help make the laws, 
they will be aware of the laws. “Knowledge,” he asserts, “remains a 
factor of compliance.”293 In addition, “giving [ANSAs] a voice in the 
creation process can help produce rules better-tailored to the 
 
 289. Petrov, supra note 221, at 296. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener present the troubling dilemma: “On the 
one hand, peace-building and state-building activities have to be implemented against the vested 
interests of armed actors in order to achieve positive results in the long run.” They continued, 
“On the other hand, progress regarding a secure environment is often only possible if at least 
the most powerful of the non-state armed actors involved can be included in a political process 
that grants them some kind of political influence (for example, posts in an interim government) 
and/or economic and financial privileges, which may in turn undermine the whole process of 
state-building.” Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 605. 
 292. Petrov, supra note 221, at 297. 
 293. Id. at 293, 299 (stating that being “part of the process, ensures awareness and 
knowledge of existing rules”). 
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situation.”294 He even argues that there seems to be support and a 
“current trend” to involve these ANSA groups in “making . . . 
international law with universal application.”295 If enough community 
support could be gleaned within these states, then perhaps there is a 
possibility, however slight, that ANSAs could be recognized as groups 
with political potential. That situation would introduce the possibility 
of expanding their reach into rebuilding the state, as long as the 
political body with the power to award those types of privileges were 
willing to award law-making power to those groups. 
Most states may see this as the riskiest of the carrot options.296 
Although it would surely incentivize ANSAs because it would offer 
them both legitimacy and decision-making power, it may simply not 
be feasible as a method of encouraging compliance with a Deed of 
Commitment. Its feasibility would likely depend on the inclinations of 
the states in unrest and whether they felt that the benefits of giving 
ANSAs political influence would outweigh the risks. For example, one 
risk is that the governments needing to be rebuilt are so unstable that 
giving ANSAs political or law-making opportunities would simply 
make a bad situation worse, because there would be no anchor 
grounding and guiding the current government nor the new 
ANSA body. 
13. Honest concern for the children 
Finally, although there are many other external incentives to 
motivate ANSAs to abide by international humanitarian norms and 
remove children from armed conflict, there is also the possibility that 
ANSAs are internally motivated. Many factors may affect an ANSA’s 
decision to “commit to humanitarian norms,” and one is simply 
 
 294. Id. at 299. 
 295. Id. at 297. But see Hofmann & Schneckener, supra note 111, at 606 (At this point, 
there is a question “whether it is possible to use these [armed non-state actors] as temporary 
solutions and building blocks for reconstructing statehood, or whether this would simply 
increase the risk of strengthening and legitimizing armed actors so that the establishment of the 
state’s monopoly on the use of force becomes even less likely.” Further, “those actors who, in 
theory, have the greatest potential for state-building and security governance are also the ones 
who can mobilize the greatest spoiling power.”). 
 296. Giving power to groups known for their involvement in armed conflict might not be 
a comfortable option for many states, particularly in states where armed conflict was the cause 
of the political unrest and the consequent need to rebuild the state. 
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“concern for the well-being of the affected population,”297 especially 
in regard to children. Ultimately, this is what motivates much of the 
outside world, and although there often appears to be a disparity 
between the goals of states and those of ANSAs, it would appear that 
“[t]he protection of children from the effects of armed conflict can be 
a rallying issue for all stakeholders, including [ANSAs] themselves.”298 
If this is true, then the internal motivation to protect children might 
be enough for ANSAs to become signatories of the Deed of 
Commitment once they realize that it aligns with their same ideals 
regarding child soldiers. Unfortunately, the fact that ANSAs continue 
to use children in their armies suggests that this might not be a likely 
incentive. However, there is still the possibility that these groups care 
for the children, as they suggest, and that improved communication 
with the international community would show that they have made 
greater strides than anticipated. Nonetheless, this carrot is 
highly unlikely. 
The preceding thirteen carrot options range from small and easily 
attainable to highly idealist and large-scale. Like the sticks, the 
effectiveness of each carrot would likely be unique to each situation. 
Overall, Geneva Call appears to be more likely to use carrots than 
sticks (other than perhaps small sanctions), and thus some of these 
options could be attractive. Despite its tendency toward carrots, what 
will likely be most successful in enforcing compliance with Deeds of 
Commitment is to use a combination of sticks and carrots. Starting 
with the smaller and more easily attainable stick and carrot options 
would likely set a more attainable success threshold for ANSA 
compliance than starting with some of the idealist large-scale ones. 
Not only would the simpler sticks and carrots be easier for states to 
acknowledge and allow, but starting small would also leave less room 
for disaster resulting from failure. Further, starting with small-scale 
options would give ANSAs room to discover and fix errors with their 
compliance before implementing more substantial sticks and carrots 
with higher stakes and more people involved. However, choosing one 
particular stick or carrot option over another will still likely be 
extremely situational.  
 
 297. Lacroix et al., supra note 129, at 11. 
 298. GENEVA CALL, supra note 1, at 4. 
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Having flexibility allows Geneva Call to mold incentives and 
enforcements into whichever combination correlates best with the 
situation. Engaging ANSAs to abide by international norms through 
this Deed of Commitment is crucial, because “[i]f we fail to engage 
armed non-State actors, we do so at the peril of affected children.”299 
Adjusting the combination of sticks and carrots to each unique 
situation will likely maximize success. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the foreward to Geneva Call’s publication In Their Words, 
Lieutenant-General the Honourable Roméo A. Dallaire, (Ret’d) 
stated that “[s]ituations are rarely black and white . . . . Yet each party 
to a conflict, State or non-State, has international obligations to 
ensure the protection of children.”300 He promoted the mindset that 
“strategies targeting armed actors on child protection are not 
contingent on the status of these actors, but rather on 
their sincerity.”301 
Ultimately, although the community mentioned in the 
introduction does not intentionally use children as soldiers, the reality 
is that many children live in an ANSA community that is in the middle 
of armed conflict. Further, these children, whether or not they 
volunteer or are forced to act as soldiers by the leadership of their 
social group, are involved in the warfare, no matter how indirectly. 
Although there are some international treaties governing this area 
of the law, most scholars agree that they are not binding on ANSAs, 
or at least have little impact on the day-to-day operations of ANSAs 
with respect to child soldiers. While Geneva Call’s Deed of 
Commitment protecting children from armed conflict is not binding, 
it still holds significant potential as a method for ANSAs to commit to 
abide by international norms in a way that is analogous to a unilateral 
statement. Based on the success of the Deed of Commitment banning 
anti-personnel landmines, it would seem as though this Deed of 
 
 299. Id. It was also suggested that if the issue of child protection “particularly child soldiers, 
[had been put] on the table during the negotiations in Rwanda, maybe there is a chance that the 
outcome could have been mitigated,” which suggests that effectively using sticks and carrots 
could have valuable and far-reaching effects. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
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Commitment, if executed in a similar fashion, would have 
similar success. 
The international community should find ways to encourage 
compliance with the Deed of Commitment for the Protection of 
Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict in order to eradicate the 
use of child soldiers. Using sticks and carrots, and combining them in 
ways to cater to specific and unique situations, can effectively 
encourage ANSAs to become signatories to and abide by this Deed. 
Complying with this Deed will increase the likelihood that those 
actors will refrain from using or involving children in warfare. The 
international community should investigate these different methods 
of enforcement and incentives in order to foster a relationship of trust 
between state and non-state actors, which would salvage the lives, and 
the innocent youthful experiences, of these children. 
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